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UNCONSCIONABILITY REVISITED: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH
RICHARD

J.

HUNTER, JR.*

Perhaps no two doctrines developed during the 19th century
and the first half of the 20th century were seen as so inimical to
the establishment of a basic fairness and equity in the marketplace
as were the doctrines of caveat emptor and an absolute "freedom
of contract." As commercial norms began to change, however, the
genesis of the philosophy of consumerism began to emerge, recognizing the importance of a genuine bargain entered into by parties
with a modicum of equal bargaining power.
In this changing environment, a new emphasis was placed on
the evolution and application of the doctrine of unconscionability,
a doctrine which had been developed as early as the mid-1750s to
deal with essentially unequal contractual situations.
This article will consider the historical development of the
doctrine of unconscionability from its common law origins through
its incorporation into the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or
Code). The article will analyze the traditional factors considered
by a court in determining whether or not a contract, or a clause of
a contract, is unconscionable; discuss the elements of "procedural
and substantive" unconscionability; and consider the application
of the substantive law of unconscionability found in the UCC (section 2-302) to collateral, non-UCC cases.
In the analysis, this article will consider the development of
federal common law in the area of unconscionability, which is
important because of the number of cases filed in federal courts
based upon "diversity" jurisdiction. The article will also analyze
the decisions of selected federal courts of the First, Second, and
Third Federal Judicial Circuits from both the early and late 1980s,
decisions which are important in the further development and
extension of the doctrine.
1. Background and the Importance of the UCC to the
Development of the Doctrine
The UCC was the product of a Permanent Editorial Board
under the joint authority of the American Law Institute and the
* Professor of Legal Studies, W. Paul Stillman School of Business, Seton Hall University.
Chair, Department of Finance and Law. University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana,
J.D. (1976).
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National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.'
A draft of the proposed statute was first approved by these bodies
in 1952, and in 1953 the UCC was enacted by the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, the first state to do so. 2 The Code was originally
published with "Official Comments" that were prepared by the
Permanent Editorial Board. The Comments, while not law in the
technical sense, have proved both valuable and critical in resolving difficulties, conflicts and problems. Reacting to recommendations of the New York Law Revision Commission (which had
rejected adoption without significant changes), the Permanent
Editorial Board made extensive revisions to the Code.' A revised
edition, known as the 1958 Official Text with Comments, was published in 1958, followed four years later by the 1962 Official Text.
Between 1957 and 1967, all states enacted the Code, with the
exception of Louisiana, which opted instead for continuance of its
own system of civil law based, to a great extent, on the Napoleonic
Code.4
The UCC contains nine articles. Article 1 contains general
provisions and definitional considerations applicable to all "transactions" governed by the Code. Article 2 broadly governs transactions in goods. 5 From the outset, however, Article 2 has been
looked to by courts for guidance in areas other than the sale of or
transactions in goods.6 Article 3 deals with commercial paper;
Article 4, bank deposits and collections; Article 5, letters of credit;
Article 6, bulk transfers; Article 7, warehouse receipts, bills of lading and other documents of title; Article 8, investment securities;
Article 9, secured transactions, security interests, sales of accounts,
and chattel paper.
Section 1-102(2) outlines the purposes and policies of the
Code:
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial
1. See William A. Schander, A Short History of the Preparationand Enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1967); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 30 (1972).
2. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 3.

3. Id.
4. Id. at 5.
5. U.C.C. § 2-102. For a definition of goods, see § 2-105.
6. See generally Daniel E. Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 447 (1971); and Note, The Uniform
Commercial Code as a PremiseforJudicialReasoning, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 880 (1965) (early
view of the future application of the Code to non-Code situations).
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practices through custom, usage and agreement of the
parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions.7*
In connection with the development of substantive law in the
area of unconscionability, Professors Calamari and Perillo have
noted that "few, if any, sections of the Uniform Commercial Code
have attracted more attention than its provision on unconscionability. ' 8 The Code writers clearly attempted to bring to the fore a
new view of the essential relationship between parties to a commercial transaction by moving away from such concepts as absolute "freedom of contract" and caveat emptor to new
responsibilities and duties for sellers. Sellers often have superior
bargaining power that enables them to extract tough and difficult
concessions from parties who have little or no economic power or
business experience and who are vulnerable to a grossly unequal
bargain.
2.

The Concept of Unconscionability

"Unconscionable is a word that defies lawyer-like definition."9
The concept of unconscionability has deep and distinct roots in the
American legal system in both law and equity but, as Chief Justice
Stone noted, primarily in equity. Stone stated that the concept of
unconscionability underlies "practically the whole content of the
law of equity."'" An early and seminal definition of unconscionability was provided by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in an English
case from 1750, Chesterfield v. Janssen:"
[A contract that] such as no man in his senses and not
under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no
honest and fair man would accept on the other; which are
2
unequitable and unconscientious bargains.'
The system of equity has traditionally been concerned with
the concept of unconscionability in the process of formation of
contracts. Courts of equity frequently set aside or refused to
7. U.C.C. §§ 1-102(2XaHc) (1991).
8. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 317 (2d ed.
1977) (footnotes omitted).
9. Id. at 325.
10. Harlan F. Stone, Book Review, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 756 (1912).
11. 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (1750).
12. Chesterfield v. Janssen, 25 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750). In this case, Johnson Spencer,
a distant ancestor of Winston Churchill, borrowed 5,000 pounds and promised to repay
20,000 pounds upon the death of his grandmother, who was then 70 years of age.
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enforce agreements based on such doctrines as undue influence,
misrepresentation, unilateral mistake, or other types of so-called
"procedural unconscionability." It thus appeared that a court of
equity would refuse to enforce a contract unless it "is fair and
open, and in regard to which all material matters known to each
have been communicated to the other."1 3 However, courts of law
generally refused to directly condemn a contract as being unconscionable, resorting instead to "imaginative flanking devices"' 4 to
set aside the underlying agreement under such theories as failure
of consideration, lack of consideration, lack of mutual assent,
duress, fraud, or a "strained interpretation15 after finding ambiguity
where [in reality] no ambiguity existed."

3. Unconscionabilityand the UCC
In Wille v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,16 Judge Harmon
noted that "the doctrine [unconscionability]... received its greatest impetus when it was enacted as a part of the Uniform Commercial Code."17 Section 2-302 of the UCC reads as follows:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the
time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result."'
It is interesting to note at this point that a precise definition
of unconscionability cannot be found in the provision, and it is
clear that the writers of the Code did not define the contours of
the doctrine. The Wille court noted that at least one writer suggested that this apparent omission may have been the "real intent
13. Rothmiller v. Stein, 38 N.E. 718, 721 (N.Y. 1894).
14. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, at 320.

"These approaches, although

producing justice in individual cases, were highly unreliable and unproductive." JOHN D.
CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRAcTS 401 (3d ed. 1987).
15. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, at 320. See also Tibbits Contracting Corp. v.

O

& E Contracting Co., 206 N.E.2d 340 (N.Y. 1965). Substantive unconscionabilityarises
when the contract terms on their face oppress one party to the point that the "conscience is
shocked" so that the "sum total of its provisions drives too hard of a bargain for a court of
conscience to assist." Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 1948).
Procedural unconscionability arises "when certain factors, such as a lack of commercial
sophistication, apparently prevent a contracting party from exercising his freedom to
choose the terms of an agreement." Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive
Unconscionability,63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1053 (1977).
16. 549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976).
17. Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 905-06 (Kan. 1976).
18. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1991).
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of the drafters of the Code."19 The court went on to say that "[t]o
define the doctrine is to limit its application, and to limit its application is to defeat its purpose. "20
The Official Comments are important in illuminating the legislative purposes of the unconscionability provision:
This section is intended to make it possible for the
courts to police explicitly against the contracts or clauses
which they find to be unconscionable. In the past such
policing has been accomplished by adverse construction
of language, by manipulation of the rules of offer and
acceptance or by determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the
contract. This section is intended to allow the court to
pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or
particular clause therein and to make a conclusion of law
as to its unconscionability. The basic test is whether, in
the light of the general commercial background and the
commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable
under the circumstances existing at the time of the makThe principle is one of the preing of the contract ....
vention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of
disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.2 1
The Code provision was designed to attain two purposes: (1)
Encourage courts to openly and directly strike down provisions of
agreements which had previously been denied enforcement
through indirect or "covert" means (Professor Karl Llewellyn,
principal author of the UCC, noted perhaps somewhat wryly:
"Covert tools are never reliable tools."); 22 and (2) Achieve a substantial merger of equity and law in the interests of a uniform
treatment of unconscionability.
4.

Implications of the Doctrine of Unconscionability

Since the general acceptance of the UCC by American courts
(accomplished during the 1960s), several interesting develop19. Wille, 549 P.2d at 906.
20. Id. (citing Clinton A. Stuntebeck, Note, The Doctrine of Unconscionability, 19
MAINE L* REV. 81, 85 (1967)).
21. U.C.C. § 2-302, Official Comment (1991) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See
also Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
22. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 365 (1960).
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ments have occurred. First, the application of section 2-302 has
extended beyond the specific area of the sale of or transactions in

goods into the main body of contract law. Seminal decisions from
the 1960s and 1970s applied the substantive law of unconscionabil-

ity to cases involving service contracts, 23 home improvement con-

tracts, 24 equipment leases (bailments),2 5 real estate brokerage
contracts, 26 space leases, 27 banking service contracts,2 8 an apartment house lease, 2 9 a security transaction under Article 9 of the
Code, 30 the lease of a service and repair gas station, 31 and the set-

tlement of a will contest.32 Cases decided in the early 1980s in
federal courts (especially in the First, Second, and Third Circuits)

further broadened and expanded the application of the doctrine. 3

Second, although it was apparent that individual consumers

were intended to be the principal beneficiaries of the doctrine of
unconscionability (on the theory that experienced or sophisticated

businessmen might be expected to be able to look out for their
own interests to a greater extent than an unsophisticated con-

sumer),34 it has now become clear that the small business entrepreneur may likewise be the victim of "unfair surprise or
hardship" and may seek the protection of the courts. However, in
the Wille case discussed earlier, the court took special note of the

business experience of the plaintiff, Mr. Wille, and denied recovery under the theory of unconscionability on the ground that Wille
was an experienced businessman (with thirteen years in the field)
rather than by focusing on the nature of the underlying agreement, pointing to the "heavy burden" placed on the small
35
businessman.
23. See County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'g Corp., 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
24. See American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964).
25. See Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Pratt, 278 A.2d 154 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1971).
26. See Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1967).
27. See Lazan v. Huntington Town House, Inc., 332 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1969),
aff'd, 330 N.Y.S.2d 751 (N.Y. App. Term. 1972).
28. See David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 298 N.Y.S.2d 847 (N.Y. App. Term.
1969).
29. See Seabrook v. Commuter Hous. Co., 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972).
30. See Hernandez v. S.I.C. Fin. Co., 448 P.2d 474 (N.M. 1968).
31. See Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971).
32. See Abbott v. Abbott, 195 N.W.2d 204 (Neb. 1972). Calamari and Perillo note that
CALAMARI &
the doctrine may have "[come] full circle to its equitable origins ......
PERILLO, supra note 8, at 323 (citing In re Estate of Vought, 334 N.Y.S.2d 720 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1972)).
33. See text, infra Parts 6 & 7.
34. Mr. Wille, for example, was a businessman with thirteen years of practical business
experience in the area of contracts. Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 904
(Kan. 1976). See infra, the text of Part 6.3 for the view of the Third Circuit in the
application of the doctrine of unconscionability to "non-merchants."
35. Wille, 549 P.2d at 910-11.
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Third, the text of the UCC makes it clear that the substantive
issue of unconscionability is one to be decided by the court as a
matter of law. 36 While challenged on the ground that such a provision denies a litigant an opportunity of a trial by jury, this section
has been upheld on the basis that the issue of unconscionability is,
at its core, an equitable issue for which no constitutional right to a
3
trial by jury exists.

1

Fourth, it must be noted that the Code provides a court with
wide latitude in fashioning remedies. The text permits the court
to select from any of the following alternatives: refuse to enforce
the contract, excise or eliminate the offending clause that is found
to be unconscionable, or limit the application of an unconscionable
clause. It is noteworthy that an early draft of the Code specifically
granted the court the right to reform (rewrite) the contract by, in
essence, remaking the bargain for the parties3 8-a practice longrejected by a court of law.39 While this provision was deleted from
the final draft, courts have, in the main, consistently redrawn bargains by reducing the price term,4 ° increasing the duration of a
business relationship arbitrarily terminated (by requiring "just
cause" in the termination of a service station franchise), 41 or by
reducing an interest rate provided for in a contract.42
Finally, in at least one jurisdiction (New Jersey), unconscionability has been held to constitute actionable fraud within the
meaning of state consumer protection legislation, permitting the
state attorney general to bring suit to enjoin the enforcement of a
contract deemed unconscionable. 43
36. U.C.C. § 2-30201) (1991).
37. See, e.g., County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'g Corp., 444 F.2d 372, 379
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). While it is essentially an issue of law on which
the court must take evidence, the matter may not be decided as a matter of summary
judgment, but only upon a hearing at which each party must be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence bearing upon the issue of unconscionability. Id. In such a
hearing, the party claiming unconscionability has the burden of establishing it. Butcher v.
Garrett-Enumclaw Co., 581 P.2d 1352, 1358 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
38. See, e.g., Note, Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code: The Consequences
of Unconscionability in Sales Contracts,63 YALE L.J. 560, 564 (1954).
39. See, e.g., Frederick v. Professional Bldg. Maintenance Indus., Inc., 344 N.E.2d 299,
301 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (the court noted that it was reluctant to subject the parties to an
agreement they had not entered).
40. See, e.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266-68 (Sup. Ct. 1969). The
"saga" of Jones continued in Star Credit Corp. v. Ingram, 347 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Civ. Ct. 1973),
in which the Star Credit Corporation was assessed $15,000 in punitive damages for
continued fraudulent and unconscionable conduct. Ingram, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
41. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 294 A.2d 253 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972),
modified, 307 A.2d 598 (N.J. 1973) (holding that a franchise contract, as a valuable business
asset, may not be cancelled without just cause). Marinello was seminal in developing basic
rights upon termination for franchisees.
42. See, e.g., In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
43. Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 653 (N.J. 1971).
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Import of the Doctrine

In analyzing the various factors which might lead a court to
declare a contract unconscionable, four have been held to be especially critical: (1) absence of meaningful choice; (2) great inequality of bargaining power; (3) inclusion of terms which might result
in surprise, hardship or oppression; (4) circumstances where race,
language, literacy, ethnicity or education are significant factors in
determining the nature of the bargain. 44
Additional factors which might be relevant to a determination
45
of unconscionability were outlined by the court in Wille:
(1) [t]he use of printed form or boilerplate contracts
drawn skillfully by the party in the strongest economic
position, which establish industry wide standards offered
on a take it or leave it basis to the party in a weaker economic position;
(2) a significant cost-price disparity or an excessive price;
(3) a denial of basic rights and remedies to a buyer of consumer goods;
(4) the inclusion of penalty clauses;
(5) the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
contract, including its commercial setting, its purposes
and actual effect;
(6) the hiding of clauses which are disadvantageous to one
party in a mass of fine print trivia or in places which are
inconspicuous to the party signing the contract;
(7) phrasing clauses in language that is incomprehensible
to a layman or that divert his attention from the problems
raised by them or the rights given up through them;
(8) an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights
imposed by the bargain;
(9) exploitation of the underprivileged, unsophisticated,
uneducated and the illiterate; and
(10) inequality of bargaining or economic power.4 6
In addition, the court in Wille noted that the doctrine of
unconscionability is used by the courts to "police the excesses of
certain parties who abuse their right to contract freely. It is
directed against one-sided, oppressive and unfairly surprising contracts, and not against the consequences per se of uneven bargain44. RICHARD J. HUNTER, THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS 16 (1987).

45. 549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976).
46. Wille v. Southwestern Bell, 549 P.2d 903, 906-07 (Kan. 1976) (citation omitted).

1992]

UNCONSCIONABILITY REVISITED

ing power or even a simple old-fashioned bad bargain. 4 7
Professor Williston, the principal author of the Restatement of
Contracts, noted that parties in general should be permitted to
contract on their own terms
without the indulgence of paternalism by courts . .
[unless] it turns out that one side or the other is to be
penalized by the enforcement of the terms of a contract
so unconscionable that no decent, fair minded person
would view the ensuing result without being possessed of
a profound sense of injustice .... 48
It is thus apparent that the two-fold purpose of section 2-302
(prevention of oppression and unfair surprise) had led to a distinction between substantive unconscionability (oppression) and procedural unconscionability (unfair surprise). However, Calamari
and Perillo note that "the cases do not neatly fall into these two
divisions. ' 49 In cases where a court has ruled an excessive price as
unconscionable, it appears clear that the purchaser was unaware
that the price was exorbitant or excessive.5 0 As a result, these "significant cost-price disparity" cases may be viewed as examples of
oppressive terms (substantive unconscionability) coupled with
unfair surprise (procedural unconscionability).
For example, in Kugler v. Romain,5 1 the court noted that
"sales solicitations were consciously directed toward minority
group consumers and consumers of limited economic means. "52
In such factual circumstances, the complaint of unconscionability
may involve disclaimers of warranties, clauses which limit damages, or those clauses which might grant a significant procedural
advantage (in the extreme, a confession of judgment clause).5 3 In
such cases, the one-sided nature of the bargain is often coupled
with the fact that the unconscionable clause is hidden in small
47. id. at 907 (citation omitted).
48. Id. SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS at 51-52 (3d ed.
Jaeger 1972) (quoting Carlsen v. Hamilton, 332 P.2d 989, 990-91 (Ut. 1958). See also M.P.
Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability,78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969).
49. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 14, at 406 (3d ed. 1987). See also Jeffrey C. Fort,
UnderstandingUnconscionability: Defining the Problem, 9 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 765 (1978).
50. See, e.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
51. 279 A.2d 640 (N.J. 1971).
52. Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 643 (N.J. 1971). See also Frostifresh Corp. v.
Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd in part, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term.
1967), where a poor Spanish-speaking person was persuaded to promise $1,145 for a $348
appliance. It was noted that "[s]ales among these people [minorities] were thought to be
easier." CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 14, at 406 n.86 (3d ed. 1987).
53. For a discussion of the application of the doctrine, see Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 97
A.2d 234 (Pa. 1953).

154

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:145

print and couched in language unintelligible to a person even of
"moderate education"--to say nothing of a higher standard requiring that a seller inform a consumer in terms "'the least educated
54
can understand.
In a case which presaged the view of the judiciary concerning
the burden placed on a party that has succeeded in pressing an
extremely hard bargain,"5 an Indiana court indicated that if a
clause places great hardship or risk upon a party in a clearly inferior bargaining position, it must affirmatively be shown that "the
provisions were explained to the other party and came to his
knowledge and there was in fact a real and voluntary meeting of
the minds and not merely an objective meeting. ' 56 It should also
be noted, however, that a Missouri court held that unconscionability might even exist where the parties are on "about an equal
57
footing."
Finally, Professor Llewellyn (among others) argues that section 2-302 should not be viewed in an analytical vacuum; rather, it
must be considered in conjunction with the obligation of "good
faith" imposed by the Code for every contract. 58 The Code
defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned" ' 9 and, in the case of a merchant, "good faith"
means "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commer60
cial standards of fair dealing in the trade."
Llewellyn further notes that while section 1-203 relates specifically to the performance or enforcement of a contract (or an
incorporated term) rather than its formation, the "good faith"
standard should be applied in determining the issue of unconscionability. 61 A series of important cases from the late 1950s and
early 1960s attempted to refine the concept of unconscionability
and, in doing so, the ruling courts have strongly focused upon the
54. See generally, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965); State v. ITM, Inc., 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
55. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948), where the court
refused to award specific performance because Campbell Soup had driven an
unconscionable bargain.
56. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. 1971).
57. Miller v. Coffeen, 280 S.W.2d 100, 104 (Mo. 1955). For a very early view, see also
Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892).
58. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1989). See LLEWELLYN, supra note 22, at 369.
59. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1989).
60. U.C.C. § 2-103(1Xb) (1989).
61. LLEWELLYN, supra note 22, at 369. This view of good faith as an "express
limitation (of) Article 2" was justified in an important 1972 Delaware case, Sherrock v.
Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648, 651 (Del. 1972). See also Robert S. Summers,
"Good Faith "In GeneralContract Law and the Sales Provisions of the UCC, 54 VA. L. REV.
195 (1968).
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element of lack of good faith.12 As noted in Kugler v. Romain,
"[t]he standard of conduct contemplated by the unconscionability
clause is good
faith, honesty in fact and the observance of fair
3
6

dealing."

6.

Unconscionabilityand the Federal Courts-The First,
Second and Third
Judicial Circuits Respond in the Early 1980s
For comparative purposes, it is important to describe the
views of three federal circuit courts of appeals on the issue of the
collateral application of the unconscionability doctrine.6"
62. See, e.g., Dow Corning Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969).
63. Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 652 (N.J. 1971).
64. In the early 1980s, only one case directly interpreted UCC § 2-302 in the Eighth
Circuit, RJM Sales & Mktg., Inc. v. Banfi Prods. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Minn. 1982).
The case involved the contention that a termination clause in a contract between the
plaintiff, a wholesale products broker, and the defendant, a wine company, was
unconscionable. Id. The district court determined that a finding of unconscionability must
be based upon a showing of both procedural and substantive unconscionability. Id. at 1375
(citing Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 139 n.12 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979) (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,
449 (D.C. Cir. 1965))). In denying the claim of unconscionability, the court noted that
neither aspect (procedural or substantive) was present and emphasized the business
experience on the part of RJM and the availability of competitive options. RIM Sales, 546
F. Supp. at 1375. The court further noted that while the termination clause was "somewhat
slanted in Banfi's favor, it is not so one-sided as to be unconscionable." Id. at 1396. In its
conclusion, the court stated that in the absence of any showing of fraud or coercion, the two
parties as merchants would be free to provide for reasonable allocations of risk in their
commercial contracts. Id. It is also important to note that the district court exclusively
relied on federal precedent in deciding the case and did not cite to any Minnesota statute or
case in making its determination.
Later in the decade, several interesting cases were decided within the Eighth Circuit.
In a case heard in the bankruptcy court, In re First United Partners 9, 71 B.R. 233 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1986), the Chief Judge held that a sales agreement was a contract of adhesion
and, as such, was unconscionable. Id. at 236. The court noted that the debtor, having been
brought to the precipice of "financial distress" through the actions of the defendant, was
faced with the defendant's offer either to accept the proferred agreement of July 26, 1984,
or suffer the consequences of a disaster, as the defendant refused to make any further
payments. Id. at 236-37. The court stated that "[tiruly, the agreement was shown to have
been such as no man in his right mind would have accepted and thus squarely within the
categories of contracts which are nullifiable as 'unconscionable' or 'contracts of adhesion.'"
Id. at 237. It is interesting to note that the court cited no precedent or authority for its
determination-possibly indicating the extent to which the notions of unconscionability and
adhesion are entrenched into the fabric of the common law.
Also in 1986, the Eighth Circuit heard a case concerning the attempt by a computer
equipment manufacturer to disclaim the warranties of fitness for a particular purpose (UCC
§ 2-315) and merchantability (UCC § 2-314) where the buyer claimed that such a disclaimer
was unconscionable. Hunter v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 798 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1986). After
dispensing with the contention that the disclaimer was not conspicuous (UCC § 2-316(2)),
the court considered the claim that the limitation was unconscionable under the Code. Id.
at 302-03.
In resolving this matter, the Eighth Circuit relied upon an Arkansas precedent,
Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods, Inc., 510 S.W.2d 555 (Ark. 1974), and noted that
"[w]hether a contract is unconscionable must be determined in light of the general
commercial background, commercial needs in the trade or particular case, the relative
bargaining position of the parties, and other circumstances at the time the contract was
made," traditional indicia of unconscionability. Hunter, 798 F.2d at 303. In distinguishing
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James Johnson commented in 1985 on the reasons for focusing
on federal unconscionability decisions:6
(1) [I]nterstate commercial cases filed in federal courts
often arise because of diversity jurisdiction. Generally,
these cases will receive treatment under state unconscionability decisions, yet "federal case law suggests that the
presumption is rebuttable"6 6 and a federal court might
instead choose to rely on a federal precedent;
(2) unconscionability remains essentially an "equitable
exercise" of each individual court;
(3) certain matters of federal litigation, especially contracts entered into by the federal government, require
the application of "federal common law. "67
*It is generally recognized that while a federal court "sitting
in" a given state is required to apply that state's common law
the case from Williams v. Walker-Thomas FurnitureCo., the court noted that "[w]e deal
here with a college educated buyer, one with some background in commercial law, who
shopped extensively for computer equipment to suit his needs." Id. The court stated that
the plaintiff had neither proved the absence of meaningful choice nor unreasonably
favorable terms, and noted that such a finding was the "gravamen of an unconscionability
claim." Id. at 304 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449
(D.C. Cir. 1965)).
In 1988, the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri heard an interesting and
novel case brought by a participant in an auto race who was injured when he was struck on
the leg and foot by a sprint car. Haines v. St. Charles Speedway, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 964
(E.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd, 874 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1989). The district court held that a release
signed by the plaintiff was not against public policy, had not been procured by pressure, and
was binding even if the plaintiff did not have the ability to read and understand it. Id. at
967-69. In rejecting the plaintiff's contentions, the court noted that despite the fact that
the plaintiff was a functional illiterate, unable to either read or understand the release, it
was "his duty to procure someone to read or explain the release to him before signing it."
Id. at 968. In this situation, where the exculpatory clause was found not to violate public
policy (see, e.g., Dunn v. Paducah Int'l Raceway, 599 F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Ky. 1984)), and in
the absence of proof of fraud, duress, mistake, or accident, the agreement would "be given
full force and effect." Haines,689 F. Supp. at 968 (citing Grand Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 564 F. Supp. 34, 38 (W.D. Mo. 1982)). The court tacitly recognized the requirement of
finding both procedural and substantive wrongdoing before it would entertain a decision as
to invalidity.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit, deciding the release was not overbroad, affirmed the
decision of the district court and noted that "we are 'to effectuate the reasonable
expectations of the average member of the public who accepts it.'" Haines v. St. Charles
Speedway, Inc., 874 F.2d 572, 575 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting Estrin Constr. Co., Inc. v. Aetna
Casualty and Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 419 n.4 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237, cmt. e (tent. draft 1973)). Thus, while the word
"unconscionable" was not specifically used, the court employed the first part of the
Williams analysis in determining that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief from an
unambiguous document which bore his signature. Cf.Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976).
65. James Johnson, Unconscionability & The Federal Chancellors: A Survey of UCC.
Section 2-302 Interpretationsin the Federal Circuits During the Early Eighties, 5 SIMON
GREENLEAF L. REV. 115 (1985).
66. Id. at 119.
67. See, e.g., Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lyons, Inc., 723 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1983).
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precedents under the rule of Erie Railroadv. Tompkins, 68 it is also
possible that a federal court might look instead to federal precedents that might be especially persuasive in the application of
unconscionability principles to collateral, non-Code matters.6 9
6.1

The First Circuit

The First Federal Judicial Circuit applied the doctrine of
unconscionability in a non-commercial case in denying a law professor's claim of wrongful discharge where the plaintiff characterized the contract as unconscionable because it required her to
execute a waiver of any substantive rights in order to be considered for tenure.7 ° In Scheele v. Mobil Oil Co.,7 1 the court refused
to limit section 2-302 to a narrow interpretation and instead
applied the doctrine of unconscionability to all aspects of the
franchise agreement (especially the termination clause) and not
just the aspects of dealing (transactions) in goods.7 2
6.2

The Second Circuit

The Second Circuit has been a bit more schizophrenic in its
decisions. It has taken a more restrained view and has been less
than enthusiastic (and unusually deferential to the prerogatives of
the legislative branch) in applying UCC standards of unconscionability to lease agreements, 7 3 largely on the ground that "there may
be some question whether the standards applicable to sales should
7 4
apply to leases in the absence of a statute.
In United States v. Bedford Associates75 the district court, on a
second remand, emphasized the substance of the lease as unreasonably favoring the government so as to be "so one-sided as to
render the alleged new lease unconscionable.""6 The court also
found the existence of procedural unconscionability in the way the
General Services Administration (GSA) had misled Bedford, noting
specifically that "the Government [had] placed Bedford in an
68. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
69. See, e.g., Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957).
70. Meehan v. New England Sch. of Law, 522 F. Supp. 484, 494 (D. Mass. 1981), aff'd,
705 F.2d 439 (1st Cir. 1983).
71. 510 F. Supp. 633 (D. Mass. 1981).
72. Scheele v. Mobil Oil Corp., 510 F. Supp. 633, 637 (D. Mass. 1981) (citing Zapatha v.
Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370 (Mass. 1980)).
73. See, e.g., Curtis J. Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 791
(1974). See also Johnson, supra note 65, at 125 n.34.
74. Berger, supra note 74, at 806-13.
75. 491 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
76. United States v. Bedford Assocs., 491 F. Supp. 851, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 657
F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 914 (1982).
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extremely precarious position financially and deprived Bedford of
any real choice of action.""7
However, in reversing the district court's decision, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals joined in expanding the standards of section 2-302 into non-commercial areas of the law which recognize
the doctrine of unconscionability as a broad matter of common law
application-but refused to do so in the case at bar.7 8 In thus
refusing this expansion, the Second Circuit emphasized the allocation of risks involved and the pricing provisions, as well as a point
of good conscience (good faith) on the part of the government:
"[W]e cannot say that the government overstepped proper boundaries in dealing with Bedford by threatening to exercise what it
79
thought was a present legal right.
Later, in the case of Credit Alliance Corp. v. Joshco Mining
Corp.,° the District Court for the Southern District Of New York
considered the issue of unconscionability in connection with an
action to recover amounts due on a promissory note.8 ' The district court outlined four factors it would consider in determining
whether the process of formation of a contract was so defective as
to be branded unconscionable. Those factors were as follows:
(1) Whether the material terms of the contract were
misunderstood;
(2) whether high-pressure sales tactics were employed;
(3) whether surprise terms were hidden in the fine print;
(4) whether gross disparity in relative bargaining power
existed. 2
The court held that procedural unconscionability will be recognized only in an "exceptional case," and denied that the defendant
had in fact made such an exceptional showing in the instant case.8 3
In BGWAssociates, Inc. v. Valley BroadcastingCo.,84 the District Court for the Southern District of New York disallowed a contention of unconscionability in a dispute involving a consultation
77. Bedford Assocs., 491 F. Supp. at 864-65 (emphasis added).
78. United States v. Bedford Assocs., 657 F.2d 1300, 1314 n.13 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 914 (1982), on remand, 548 F. Supp. 732,748 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (emphasizing

the "subjective" belief of the defendant).
79. Bedford Assocs., 657 F.2d at 1314 n.13.
80. 90 F.R.D. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
81. Credit Alliance Corp. v. Joshco Mining Corp., 90 F.R.D. 187, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
82. See id. at 189.
83. Id.
84. 532 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), upheld, 532 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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contract.8 5 In doing so, however, the court relied upon Williams
v. Walker-Thomas FurnitureCo.86 for its definition of unconscionability (encompassing both procedural and substantive unconscionability) as "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of
the contracting parties, together with contract terms unreasonably
favorable to the other party."8 7 The court in BGW Associates
implied that a showing of unconscionability requires both an
absence of "meaningful choice," as where there is a "gross disparity [or inequality] of bargaining power," ' and contract terms that
are "unreasonably favorable" to one party.8 9
Thus, the courts of the Second Circuit joined in a legitimate
policy debate in inquiring if a court would require proof of both
procedural and substantive unconscionability. While Justice Story
argued that under the common law, both were required for a true
"meeting of the minds," 90 Johnson argues as forcefully that the
"U.C.C. probably contemplates only a showing of either" and that
"the presence of either arguably should suffice to prove unconscionableness even though a showing of a grossly unreasonable
exchange is helpful." 91
One thing seems fairly clear from the myriad of decisions of
the important Second Circuit: unconscionability is indeed a rarity
in cases between merchants, and the extension of section 2-302 to
non-UCC cases was "treated cautiously" yet favorably in Bedford,
even while ruling against the plaintiff on the underlying question.
Bedford, however, stands as an important precedent for its core
affirmation of the Second Circuit's understanding of and belief in
unconscionability as potentially an important policy tool generally
in the area of contract law.
6.3

The Third Circuit

The Third Federal Judicial Circuit decided a series of important cases in the early 1980s in the area of unconscionability. A
New Jersey case, Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register
Corp.,92 concerned the sale of a computer system in which the
seller resisted the buyer's claim for consequential damages on the
85. BGW Assocs., Inc. v. Valley Broadcasting Co., 532 F. Supp. 1112, 1114 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), upheld, 532 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
86. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
87. BGW, 532 F. Supp. at 1114 (citations omitted).
88. Id. (noting that defendant had "ample opportunity to explore alternatives").
89. Id.
90. W. STORY, CONTRACTS 401-02 (1884).
91. Johnson, supra note 65, at 128 n.52.
92. 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:145

ground that an exclusive remedy existed in the contract. 93 The
circuit court, in upholding the liability of the seller for breach of
warranty, suggested sua sponte that the proper test in such a case
was that of unconscionability, although this issue had not even
94
been raised at the trial level.
In a Pennsylvania case, Camerlo v. Howard Johnson Co.,95 a
suit was filed by a lessor seeking a declaratory judgment that a
lease was void and unenforceable for several reasons, one of which
was unconscionability.9 6 In deciding the case based on unconscionability, the court again acknowledged two types of unconscionability, "substantive" and "procedural," while emphasizing the
elements of gross disparity in price, "terms which violate the reasonable expectations of the parties," and procedural irregularities
in the formation of the contract.97
Another district court in Pennsylvania examined three separate instances in which unconscionability had been raised as an
issue in the context of dealings "between merchants": Stanley A.
Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co.," Argo Welded Products,Inc. v. J T
Ryerson Steel & Sons, Inc.," and Melso v. Texaco, Inc.'
In Stanley A. Klopp, the court concluded that the UCC was
generally applicable to a franchise agreement, at least "by analogy."101 However, the court did note that while unconscionability
is especially applicable in cases involving consumers, the doctrine
will "rarely" be recognized in cases between merchants. 0 2
Argo Welded points to the heavy burden borne by a merchant
who claims relief under a theory of unconscionability1 0 3 In dismissing the plaintiff's claim, the court noted the long history of
prior dealings between the parties as clear evidence that would
effectively refute a claim of "unfair surprise. "104
Finally, in Melso the district court considered a class action
suit filed by a group of independent Texaco retailers who strenu93. Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1085-86 (3d Cir.
1980).
94. Id. at 1086-87.
95. 545 F. Supp. 395 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
96. Camerlo v. Howard Johnson Co., 545 F. Supp. 395, 398 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
97. Id.
98. 510 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd mem., 676 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1982).
99. 528 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
100. 532 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd mem., 696 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1982).
101. Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
aff.'d mem., 676 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1982).
102. Stanley A. Klopp, Inc., 510 F. Supp. at 810.
103. See Argo Welded Prods., Inc. v. J. T. Ryerson Steel & Sons, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 583,
593 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
104. Id.
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ously objected to the company's practice of assessing a three per105
cent credit card invoice processing fee against the retailers.
One of the grounds cited by the retailers was that the standard
form contract executed by each of them was unconscionable as a
matter of Pennsylvania law. 10 6 In his decision, Justice Broderick
once again noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Witmer
v. Exxon Corp.1 o7 had adopted the "classic and oft-quoted" definition of unconscionability formulated by Judge Wright in WalkerThomas.l08 The court then proceeded to dismiss the instant complaint, finding that the retailers were neither "unsophisticated,
unreasonably charged, nor without reasonable alternatives."' 0 9
7.

Unconscionabilityin the 1990s-The Recent Past
Provides a Glimpse of the Future

Throughout the 1980s, the First, Second and Third Circuit
Courts of Appeals continued to confront a variety of situations and
cases in which the issue of unconscionability was raised. In light of
the prevalence of cases decided by federal courts because of diversity actions, a sampling of representative cases from the mid and
late 1990s may provide critical guidance to the future application
of the doctrine of unconscionability in both federal and state
courts.
7.1

The First Circuit

Securities Industry Ass'n v. Connolly'10 provides an interesting glimpse into a collateral application of the unconscionabiity
doctrine into two areas of law which themselves will assume
greater prominence in the 1990s: alternative dispute resolution
and commercial arbitration."' The trade association of securities
broker-dealers in Massachusetts brought an action challenging the
constitutionality of state regulations concerning pre-dispute arbitration agreements on the ground that the Massachusetts regulations were preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. 1 2 It was
alleged that the regulations were patently designed to countermand a practice in which broker-dealers required customers to
105. Melso v. Texaco, Inc. 532 F. Supp. 1280, 1281-82, 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd
mem., 696 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1982).
106. Melso, 532 F. Supp. at 1295.
107. 434 A.2d 1222 (Pa. 1981).
108. Melso, 532 F. Supp. at 1295.
109. Id. at 1296-97.
110. 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989).
111. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1119-21 (1st Cir. 1989).
112. Id. at 1116 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)).
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sign pre-dispute arbitration agreements (PDAAs) as a condition
precedent to the establishment of an account relationship.1 1 3 The
circuit court noted that the regulations were also "patently inhospitable to arbitration" in that they "(i) bar firms from requiring
individuals to enter PDAAs as a nonnegotiable condition precedent to account relationships; (ii) order the prohibition brought
'conspicuously' to the attention of prospective customers; and (iii)
demand full written disclosure of 'the legal effect of the pre-dispute arbitration contract or clause.' "114
In its analysis, the circuit court made reference to the case of
Perry v. Thomas,"15 and noted that a core question in the case was
not whether the law of unconscionability applied to arbitration,
but which law of unconscionability applied" 6-a choice of law
question which, in a diversity action, might require the application
of either federal or state common law. Interestingly, the First Circuit specifically stated that "[t]he Court has not seen fit to question
use of standard-form contracts in circumstances where parties having apparently unequal bargaining power have agreed to arbitrate."' 1 7 This reaffirmed the notion that a combination of both
procedural and substantive unconscionability would be required
to attack the inclusion of such a clause in a broker-related
contract."18
In a second case decided by the First Circuit in September of
1988, Boston Edison Co. v. FERC,'1 9 municipal utility companies
under long-term electricity supply contracts challenged the inclusion of additional interest by Boston Edison arising from the construction of a nuclear power plant.12 0 The terms of the contract
limited interest expenses calculated in the rate to the interest on
the original construction of the facility.12 ' When FERC found for
the customers, the utility appealed. The court applied what is
113. Id. at 1116-17. See also Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 949 (1978) (discussing industry standards as to the use of arbitration claims).
114. Connolly, 883 F.2d at 1117 (citations omitted).
115. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
116. Connolly, 883 F.2d at 1119 n.3. See also New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone
Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988).
117. Connolly, 883 F.2d at 1124 n.9. The court also stated that "[fthe use of a standard
form contract between two parties of admittedly unequal bargaining power does not
invalidate an otherwise valid contractual provision." Id. (citing Webb v. R. Rowland & Co.,
Inc., 800 F.2d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 1986)).
118. For a collateral definition in a case involving an arbitration clause under UCC § 2207, see N&D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Indus., Inc., 548 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1976). See also
Anthony G. Eonas, Mediation: An ExpandingRole in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 23 N.
ATL. REG. Bus. L. REV. 27 (1990).
119. 856 F.2d 361 (1st Cir. 1988).
120. Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 856 F.2d 361, 362-63 (1st Cir. 1988).
121. See id. at 364.
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termed the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine 122 and took notice that an
important and salient purpose of the Federal Power Act' 2 3 was to
preserve the "'integrity of contracts'... [thereby permitting] 'the
stability of supply arrangements.' ",124 The court took special cognizance of the importance of maintaining the integrity of agreements, absent any assertion that the claims limitation clause is
"unconscionable, overweening, or otherwise unreasonable.'

25

The court thus concluded that the practice of recognizing the
integrity of agreements, absent unconscionability, "bring[s] cer-6
12
tainty to the parties' dealings after an adequate period of time.' 1
In E.H. Ashley & Co. v. Wells FargoAlarm Services,1 27 the
court considered a contract containing a limitation of liability
clause.' 2 8 The plaintiff claimed the contract was one of adhe0 and a
sion.' 29 The court cited both Williams v. Walker-Thomas 13
1986 Rhode Island Supreme Court case, Grady v. Grady,13' in
which certain idicia of unconscionability were noted: "disproportionate bargaining power, non-availability of
alternatives, and ille1' 32
gal, oppressive, or unreasonable contract.'

Putting to rest the notion that the courts may be generally
hostile to limitation of liability clauses "against allegations that
' 33
they are violative of public policy or [per se] unconscionable,'
the Ashley court noted that the facts presented were essentially
identical to those presented in Firemen's Fund American Insurance Cos. v. Burns Electronic Security Services, Inc.,1' 4 which
stated that, on the contrary, " 'the [limitation of liability] clause
was a commercially sensible arrangement, and the plaintiff is
bound by it.' "'135
It might also be well to note that the court made pointed reference to the lack of several other traditional indications of unconscionability: "[t]he limitation of liability clause was set forth in the
122. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956);
Federal Power Comm'n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956).
123. Federal Power Act § 205(d) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (1988)).
124. Boston Edison Co., 856 F.2d at 370 (quoting Mobile Gas, 350 U.S. at 344).
125. Id. at 372.
126. Id.
127. 907 F.2d 1274 (1st Cir. 1990).
128. E.H. Ashley & Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 907 F.2d 1274 (1st Cir. 1990).
129. Id. at 1277-78.
130. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
131. 504 A.2d 444 (R.I. 1986).
132. E.H. Ashley, 907 F.2d at 1278 (citing Leasing Servs. Corp. v. Graham, 646 F.
Supp. 1410 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
133. Id. (citing Ostalkiewicz v. Guardian Alarm, 520 A.2d 563 (R.I. 1987)).
134. 417 N.E.2d 131 (I11.
App. Ct. 1981).
135. E.H. Ashley, 907 F.2d at 1279 (quoting Firemen's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Burns
Elec. Sec. Servs., Inc., 417 N.E.2d 131, 132-33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)).
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most conspicuous print ... [;] [t]he contract was written in plain
English; ... [and] [t]here was no disparity in sophistication or bargaining power. ' 136 Because the plaintiff had asserted no facts
whatsoever to support its bare contention that the contract was
unconscionable, the court concluded that Aetna had no legal
grounds for pursuing the appeal and directed that Aetna and its
attorney be required to pay double costs and all reasonable attor37
ney's fees expended by the plaintiff in defending the appeal.'
Perhaps the real importance of the Firemen'sFund case lies in
the clear indication that principles of unconscionability have
become so well-settled that the mere allegation of unconscionability and nothing more is no guarantee of sympathy from a court
38
reviewing a record on appeal.'
7.2

The Second Circuit

In June of 1987, the Second Circuit decided Middle East
Banking Co. v. State Street Bank International,139 in which a bank
customer alleged a breach of the depository contract and tortious
conversion of the customer's funds upon the bank's debit of the
customer's account and the return of funds to another bank which
had originally deposited them under the so-called "CHIPS" system.1 40 The court decided one of the issues (the effect of a waiver)
by referring to the doctrine of unilateral mistake 14 1 judged by a
standard of unconscionability, the basis of which may be found in
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 153:
Where a mistake of one party at the time a contract was
made as to a basic assumption on which he made the contract has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances that is adverse to him, the contract is voidable
by him if he does not bear the risk of the mistake... and
136. Id. The court also noted that the officer who signed for Ashley admitted he
understood the meaning of the limitation clause and made no effort to negotiate different or
better terms. Id.
137. Id. at 1280. See also FED. R. App. P. 38 & 39 (allowing the sanction of attorney's
fees).
138. The Ashley court noted as follows: "Aetna's appeal in this case was wholly
without merit because the result was obvious. The overwhelming weight of precedent
militates against Aetna's position." E.H. Ashley, 907 F.2d at 1280.
139. 821 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1987).
140. Middle E. Banking Co. v. State St. Bank Int'l, 821 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1987). The
Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS) is a "computerized funds transfer
system used to process a large number of payments between banks." Id. at 900 n. 1. At the
time of Middle E. Banking, 140 banks participated in the system. Id.
141. Id. at 910. See generally 3 WILLISTON ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 154 (4th ed.
1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1979) (setting out the doctrine of
unilateral mistake).
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(a) the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of
the contract would be unconscionable ....142
Comment a under section 153 explains the rule: "[T]here has, in
addition, been a growing willingness to allow avoidance where the
consequences of the mistake are so 1grave
that enforcement of the
' 43
contract would be unconscionable.'

In its summary, the Middle East Banking court noted that the
"New York courts clearly would consider whether [the plaintiff]
should be allowed to void the contract of release on the ground
that the effect of its mistake with respect thereto is such
that the
1 44
enforcement of the release would be unconscionable."'

West 14th Street Commercial Corp. v. 5 West 14th Owners
Corp.145 involved the application of unconscionability to a quasilease situation. 146 In this case, the Second Circuit was asked 1to
47
construe the Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief Act,
which was enacted to protect the rights of tenants whose residential apartments were subject to conversion to cooperatives or condominiums. 148

Judge Cardamone recognized that Congress had

involved itself in the process because "many tenants are too unsophisticated on account of age or infirmity to evaluate properly the
complex choices offered [to] them upon conversion ....

-14

How-

ever, Congress also recognized that developers merit a "fair
return" on their investments. 15 0 The major issue thus became
one of judging whether or not a developer's profit is unconscionable or whether or not individual leases entered into were
unconscionable. 151

52
The West 14th court construed section 3608(c) of the Act,'
which requires that upon a showing of unconscionability, "the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence
at least as to:
(1) the commercial setting of the negotiations;
(2) whether a party has knowingly taken advantage of the
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153, cmt. a (1974).

143. Id.
144. Middle E. Banking, 821 F.2d at 911.
145. 815 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1987).
146. West 14th St. Commercial Corp. v. 5 West 14th Owners Corp., 815 F.2d 188 (2d
Cir. 1987).
147. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3601-16 (1982).
148. West 14th, 815 F.2d at 190.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 3608(c) (1982).
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inability of the other party reasonably to protect his
interests;
(3) the effect and purpose of the lease or portion thereof,
including its relationship to other contracts between the
association, the unit owners and the developer or an affiliate of the developer; and
(4) the disparity between the amount charged under the
lease and the value of the real estate subject to the lease
measured by the price at which similar real estate was
15 3
readily obtainable in similar transactions.'
The court, recognizing the importance of unconscionability as an
underlying basis of the Act itself, quoted from a statement of Senator Harrison Williams, the author of the Act: "It is our intent that
courts permit evidence on such matters as the relative bargaining
54
position of the parties."'
7.3

The Third Circuit

In a 1987 case from the Third Circuit, 202 Marketplace v.
Evans Products Co., 55 the court considered the question of
whether or not a landlord had the right to terminate a lease
because of a tenant's breach and default, and clearly raised as a
major component the issue of unconscionability.' 5 6 The court
noted that under Pennsylvania law, four criteria determine
whether a landlord may declare a forfeiture:
Before a landlord may declare a forfeiture of a lease,...
it must prove the existence of each of the following criteria: (1) that the right to declare a forfeiture was distinctly
reserved; (2) that the proof of the happening of the event
upon which the right is to be exercised is clear; (3) that
the party entitled to do so exercised his right promptly;
and (4) that the result of enforcing the forfeiture is not
5 7
unconscionable.1
Yet, the court failed to move beyond a mere generic statement of
the importance of unconscionability to an acceptance of the prin1 58
ciple in the instant case, upholding the forfeiture.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
added)).
158.

West 14th, 815 F.2d at 200 n.8 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 3608(c) (1982)).
Id. at 201 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. 28, 179 (1980)).
824 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1987).
202 Marketplace v. Evans Prods. Co., 824 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1366 (quoting Cleveland v. Salwen, 141 A. 155, 156 (Pa. 1928) (emphasis
Id. at 1368.
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In another important and well publicized case decided on January 5, 1990, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,15 1 a smoker and her
husband brought an action against two cigarette manufacturers
after the smoker had contracted lung cancer. 16 0 After the smoker
died of lung cancer, her husband continued the action, both individually and as executor of his wife's estate.1 6 1 In discussing the
claim of breach of an express warranty under UCC section 2-313
and applicable New Jersey law (regarding the health effects of
smoking), the court first noted that "authority on the question of
whether reliance [on specific statements of the cigarette manufacturer] is a necessary element of Section 2-313 is divided.'1

62

The

court noted that no New Jersey court had addressed this question. 163 In support of this proposition, the court dropped a footnote citing Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc.,' in which the Superior
Court of New Jersey held that a tire manufacturer's efforts to limit
the remedy for breach of an express warranty to replacement of
the tire was unconscionable and unenforceable.' 65 The Collins
court did not discuss the issue of "basis of the bargain" but focused
instead on the patent unconscionability of the remedy limitation,6 6a
more traditional application of the unconscionability doctrine.1
In Cipollone, the circuit court noted that "the buyer's reliance on
an advertisement making broad claims about the safety of the
product was thought relevant to the issue of unconscionability
[and] does not necessarily imply that the buyer's nonreliance...
would have precluded the advertisement from becoming part of
the manufacturer's express warranty.' 1

67

Cipollone clearly stands

as an indication that the doctrine of unconscionability is still relevant and important to the more traditional category of UCC cases.
In Berger v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,168 an
action stemming from a dispute concerning an auto accident
159. 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
160. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S.
Ct. 1386 (1991).
161. Id. at 552.
162. Id. at 564. See, e.g., Winston Indus., Inc. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 317 So. 2d 493
(Ala. Civ. App. 1975) (purchaser permitted to sue under § 2-313 for breach of a warranty he
never received), cert. denied, 317 So. 2d 500 (Ala. 1975); Royal Typewriter Co. v.
Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1101 (1 th Cir. 1983) ("absence of reliance will
negate the existence of an express warranty").
163. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 564.
164. 315 A.2d 30 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1973) (per curiam).
165. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 564 n.24 (citing Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 315 A.2d 30 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1973) (per curiam)).
166. Id.
167. Id..
168. 834 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1987).
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involving an auto owned and insured by the plaintiff and driven by
his son, the court considered the issue of unconscionability as a collateral matter and noted as follows: " '[The parties] apparently
were of equal bargaining power, and were represented by counsel. The bargain which was struck involved no unfair advantage or
unconscionability as to either. The parties were free to arrange for
whatever degree of risk they desired.' 1169 It is also interesting to
note a rather realistic view stated by the court concerning the
nature of insurance contracts: "'In New Jersey, it has long been
established that while insurance policies are contractual in nature,
they are not ordinary contracts but contractsof adhesion between
parties who are not equally situated.' "170
However, while New Jersey courts have focused their attention on the element of inequality of bargaining power as a necessary requisite to any finding of unconscionability, they have at the
same time recognized that in certain contracts, "construction of
insurance policy language is not ordinarily controlled by the standards applicable to a contract negotiated at arms length between
two parties on the same plane.' 7 1 Thus, even the existence of a
decidedly adhesive contract (substantive unconscionability), recognized as such by the court, may not necessarily condemn a contract as unconscionable, absent the allegation of procedural
unconscionability.
Finally, in a case arising out of a notorious incident, Hodes v.
S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione,12 the passengers of the
Achille Lauro brought an action arising out of the terrorist
hijacking of the ship by Palestinian terrorists off the coast of Egypt
on October 7, 1985.171 The district court held that the "foreign
forum selection clause" in a cruise ship ticket was unenforceable.17 4 The appellate court held that the clause was enforceable
1 75
and reversed the decision of the district court.
Among the terms and conditions of the contract of passage
were thirty-two fine print articles found on the back of the ticket.
Article 31 stated as follows: "'All controversies that may arise
directly or indirectly in connection with or in relation to this pas169. Berger v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 834 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1987)
(quoting County of Somerset v. Durling, 415 A.2d 371, 374 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980)).
170. Id. at 1162 (quoting Meier v. New Jersey Life Ins. Co., 503 A.2d 862, 869 (N.J.
1986) (emphasis added)).
171. Linden Motor Freight Co., v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 A.2d 217, 224 (N.J. 1963).
172. 858 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1988).
173. Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1988).
174. Id. at 906.
175. Id.
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sage contract must be instituted before the judicial authority in
Naples [Italy], the jurisdiction of any other authority being

expressly renounced and waived.'

"1176

Interestingly, the court framed the issue as whether the terms
and conditions of the cruise ship ticket were "reasonably communicated" to the passenger before the passenger boarded the vessel,
a question of law for the court. 177 This formulation may be viewed
as a correlative to earlier cases in which the courts stressed the
necessity of communication ("meeting of the minds") as a necessary requisite to finding that the principle of unconscionability
would not apply.
In Hodes, the court noted that the conditions had been communicated to the passengers prior to their boarding of the Achille
Lauro (through the appellees' travel agent), and thus "appellees
[were] charged with notice of the ticket provisions.' 7 In finding
that the provisions had been effectively communicated, therefore,
the court could find no evidence of unconscionability.
8.

Conclusion

The application of section 2-302 of the UCC to Code cases
may be practically limited to a showing of both procedural and
substantive unconscionability. This view has its clear origin in
Judge Wright's formulation of unconscionability in Williams as "an
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to
the other party.' 1 79 Yet, in reality, there will be few instances
where a contract is so one-sided as to."shock the conscience of the
court" (substantive unconscionability) absent some strong evidence of unfair surprise, clauses hidden in fine print, or the exercise of grossly unequal bargaining power during the process of
contract formation (procedural unconscionability).
In a wide range of non-Code cases, decisions of the First, Second and Third Federal Circuits in the 1980s indicate that the doctrine of unconscionability is a viable and valuable point of critical
reference for evaluating contracts that smack of one-sidedness, an
absence of meaningful choice, great inequality of bargaining
power, or the failure to directly communicate important contract
176. Id. at 907 (quoting contract of passage).
177. Id. at 911.
178. Hodes, 858 F.2d at 912. See also Marek v. Marpan Two, Inc., 817 F.2d 242 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 852 (1987).
179. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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terms. At the same time, however, no longer will the naked "allegation" of unconscionability result in a contract being striken by
the courts.
In contrast to the pre-Code application of the unconscionability doctrine (which accomplished its intended purpose often
through an indirect "manipulation" of the common law), the comment to section 2-302 suggests a "conspicuous intent"'' 10 of the
writers to use the doctrine of unconscionability to lessen the burden contained in either boilerplate contracts or fine print clauses,
particularly in warranty disclaimers or limitation of remedy
clauses.' 8 ' Taken together with sections 2-316 [Exclusion or Modification of Warranties] and 2-719 [Contractual Modification or
Limitation of Remedy], and recognizing that a fine-print clause
can infact misrepresent the true and conscious agreement ("meeting of the minds") between the parties, section 2-302 can serve
courts well, not only in their responsibility of equitable supervision
of contracts for the sale of goods, but also in other collateral contracting matters. In doing so, the courts may facilitate the creation
of an equitable "corporate conscience" that reflects a fundamental
fairness and equity in contractual relations, decisively rejecting
the sordid history of caveat emptor and the empty notions of an
absolute "freedom of contract." This process may also point to the
further importance of federal precedent in fleshing out the parameters of the unconscionability doctrine in both Code and non-Code
cases.

180. Johnson, supra note 66, at 180.
181. See U.C.C. § 2-302, Official Cmt. 1 (1989) (citing Campbell Soup v. Wentz, 172
F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948)). Accord J. HONNONL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
SALES AND SALES FINANCING 26-27 (4th ed. 1976).

